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Abstract—The rise of ubiquitous deepfakes, misinformation,
disinformation, propaganda and post-truth, often referred to as
fake news, raises concerns over the role of Internet and social
media in modern democratic societies. Due to its rapid and
widespread diffusion, digital deception has not only an individual
or societal cost (e.g., to hamper the integrity of elections), but
it can lead to significant economic losses (e.g., to affect stock
market performance) or to risks to national security. Blockchain
and other Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) guarantee the
provenance, authenticity and traceability of data by providing
a transparent, immutable and verifiable record of transactions
while creating a peer-to-peer secure platform for storing and
exchanging information. This overview aims to explore the
potential of DLTs and blockchain to combat digital deception,
reviewing initiatives that are currently under development and
identifying their main current challenges. Moreover, some recom-
mendations are enumerated to guide future researchers on issues
that will have to be tackled to face fake news, disinformation
and deepfakes, as an integral part of strengthening the resilience
against cyber-threats on today’s online media.
Index Terms—blockchain; DLT; deepfake; fake news; data
traceability; decentralization; cybersecurity; dApps; information
security; proof of authenticity; forensics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Gartner predicts that the majority of individuals in devel-
oped economies will consume more false than true information
by 2022 [1]. While trust in mass media and established
institutions is declining, the use of online social media to
connect with people around the world is rising sharply and it
has become an important source for the distribution of digital
deception.
Today, social media platforms miss an adequate regulation
and their roles and responsibilities are still not clearly defined.
A number of issues are still open [2], like the application of
adequate data protection rules (e.g., General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR)) along with the market concentration in
just a few social media companies worldwide.
This work has been funded by the Xunta de Galicia (ED431C 2016-045,
ED431G/01), the Agencia Estatal de Investigacio´n of Spain (TEC2016-75067-
C4-1-R) and ERDF funds of the EU (AEI/FEDER, UE).
Digital deception is generally understood as deceptive or
misleading content created and disseminated to cause public or
personal harm (e.g., post-truth, populism, satire) or to obtain a
profit (e.g., clickbaits, cloaking, ad farms, identity theft). In the
context of mass media, digital deception originates either from
governments or non-state actors that publish content without
economic or educational entrance barriers. As a consequence,
this horizontal and decentralized communications cannot be
controlled or stopped with traditional centralized tools. In
addition, this lack of supervision allows for security attacks
(e.g., social engineering). Moreover, traditional mass media are
not out of the discussion, since the veracity of their information
appears to be sometimes negotiable for the sake of turnover
growth, as the competition is increasingly tough.
In addition, advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) (e.g.,
deep learning, machine learning, natural language processing)
have recently been used to create sophisticated digital decep-
tion. As a result, a number of research projects as well as
regulations have been launched to detect digital deception [3].
Researchers claim that although ubiquitous content can be
hardly supervised, the traceability of the data, the communi-
cations architecture and the transactions, can be controlled.
However, the problems involved in developing effective ways
to identify, test, transmit and audit information are still open.
Today, Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) and specif-
ically blockchain, present challenges but also opportunities
for stakeholders and policymakers as potential technologies
that can help to combat digital deception. These technologies
enable privacy, security and trust in a decentralized Peer-to-
Peer (P2P) network without any central managing authority.
There are only a few articles of the literature that use
blockchain to combat digital deception and they are mostly
focused on tracing the source of the information. To the
knowledge of the authors, this is the first article that proposes
a holistic approach to combat digital deception through DLTs.
Thus, this article provides a comprehensive overview on
the phenomenon and its prevalence, on the applicability of
DLTs to tackle digital deception and on the main challenges
they pose. The aim of this paper is to foresee the potential
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TABLE I
MAIN FAKE NEWS FEATURES: CONTENT, PLATFORM, ORIGINATORS, TARGET EVENTS, OBJECTIVES, TOOLS AND SOLUTIONS.
Type
of
content
Platforms Originators Targets Objectives Tools Solutions
• Text
• Image
• Video
• Audio
• Traditional mass
media
• Fake news sites
• Social media
(Twitter, Facebook,
Instagram, Reddit)
• Messaging apps
(Whatsapp, WeChat)
• Google, YouTube
• Wikipedia
• Governments
• Political parties
• Military
• Economic elites
• For-profit
organizations,
business competitors
• Advertisers
• Organized crime
(e.g., mafias)
• News media
• Elections
• Referendums
• Anti-migrant
campaigns
• Financial information
(e.g., stock market)
• National security
• Science and
technology
• Entertainment
• Natural disasters
• Urban legends
• Polarization of
society, win the
elections and
discredit opponents
• Undermine trust
• Disengagement
• Increased xenophobia
• Conspiracy
• Criminal activity
(e.g., bribery,
corruption, fraud)
• Misinformation
• Disinformation
• Hoaxes
• Mal-information
• Propaganda
• E-mail hacking
• Releasing
confidential
information
• Hate speech
• Spammer, bot and
troll networks
• Ensuring transparency and data protection
• Independent-fact checking
• Quality journalism and media literacy
• Data trustworthiness
• Clickbait, cloaking and ad farms detection
• Propaganda detection
• Network-based spread analysis
• Impact measurements on citizen beliefs and
behavior
• Debunking myths
• Regulatory actions, policy initiatives
• Ransomware protection
contribution of DLT for revolutionizing the media industry
and face today’s challenges.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews the state-of-the-art of current digital deception and the
involved technologies. Section III proposes different aspects
of DLT to combat digital deception. In Section IV the main
challenges of the application of DLT to tackle digital deception
are analyzed and some recommendations are proposed with the
aim of guiding future researchers on some of the limitations
to be confronted. Finally, Section V is devoted to conclusions.
II. STATE-OF-THE ART
A. Main characteristics of fake news and disinformation
A fake new is characterized by the following main elements
(which are extended in Table I) [2]:
• The content is designed to wholly or partially deceive,
manipulate or mislead, or it utilizes unethical persuasion
techniques (e.g., propaganda or ideology-driven content).
• It is focused on generating insecurity, hostility or polar-
ization, or it attempts to disrupt democracy, in particular
democratic processes (e.g., elections, referendums), fun-
damental rights or the rule of law.
• It covers matters of public interest (e.g., politics, health,
environment).
• Its information is disseminated strategically through au-
tomated and aggressive techniques (e.g., campaign-like
manners, fake accounts, bots, micro-targeting or trolls).
• It has characteristics that enable rapid and widespread
diffusion. In fact, fake news are likely to spread faster
and further than the truth [4].
• It is increasingly resistant to detection as enablers such
as AI, Internet of Things (IoT), Augmented Reality (AR)
and Virtual Reality (VR) are progressing rapidly, and
since the identification of fake news has received less
resources (i.e., funding and institutional backing) than
their creation.
B. Prevalence and impact of fake news
Although the potential influence of fake news still remains
uncertain, in at least a few cases (e.g., the Brexit campaign,
the independence of Catalonia), they appear to have impacted
significantly public behavior. An example is the so-called
misinfodemics, where health misinformation (e.g., the effect
of vaccines) is enabling the spread of diseases. Fake news
impact two main areas:
• Privacy and data protection. Services offered by platform
providers are increasingly driven by big data monetiza-
tion. For example, biometrics and recognition systems
(e.g., face, eye, voice and emotions) appear to further
increase the vulnerability of data privacy, exposing in
some cases personal data involuntarily (e.g., psychologi-
cal traits).
• Freedom of expression and the right to receive reliable
information.
C. The role of emerging technologies and deepfakes
Forging information has never been easier thanks to a
range of free content-generation software. Moreover, with
emerging technologies like IoT, people is more exposed to
being monitored. Furthermore, the capacity of AR and VR to
imitate reality is growing and can be harmful, since immersive
experiences are less subject to rational thinking and they
amplify the effects of potential manipulations.
In addition, Natural Language Processing (NLP) and AI
are expected to drive the upcoming counterfeit reality, where
detecting manipulation will become almost impossible for
people and more difficult for machines [5]. For instance,
Deep Learning (DL) is being increasingly used to create
models such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) that
enable realistic manipulations of image and video that are
unrecognizable by both human and machines (i.e., deepfakes).
The emergence of deepfakes will exacerbate significantly
the impact of digital deception. Individuals, businesses and
society as a whole may face novel forms of extortion as well
as additional risks for democracy and national security.
Several approaches have been described in the literature that
make use of modern tools and techniques, and that combine
technologies to tackle the problem of digital deception (e.g.,
network analysis, crowd-sourcing algorithms). On the one
hand emerging technologies will make fake news significantly
more successful but, on the other hand, the same technologies
can help to tackle them (e.g., smart filtering) and leave traces
that enable further investigation of malicious actions.
D. The role of new media
Social media organize and amplify the effect of content
communication. Citizens may believe that the content they
consume is user-generated, spontaneous, neutral and universal,
while the truth is that such a content may have been provided
strategically and micro-targeted [2]. In addition, social media
privacy policies and terms of service allows for collecting
citizens’ big data (e.g., patterns, profiles) to sell them to a
number of actors for massive profiling, advanced demographic
analytics, micro-targeted advertising and the automation of
content. For instance, lack of transparency hinders advertiser
traceability (as they may deliberately hide their identity or use
intermediaries) and makes it more difficult to obtain digital
evidence to reinforce liability.
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Fig. 1. DLT and blockchain key capabilities to combat digital deception.
E. DLTs and blockchain capabilities
DLTs like Tangle or blockchain are able to provide seam-
less authentication, efficient and secure data storage, pro-
cessing and sharing, robustness against attacks, scalability,
transparency and accountability. Such features (illustrated in
Figure 1), together with the use of smart contracts enabled by
oracles, can play an effective role in combating fake news,
considering that transactions cannot be tampered once they
have been distributed, accepted and validated by a network
consensus [6] and stored in blocks. Moreover, transactions are
easily auditable by all the involved stakeholders. A description
on the inner workings of DLTs and blockchain is out of the
scope of this article, but the interested reader can find detailed
information on how to design a blockchain according to the
business needs and deployment environment in [7], [8].
III. LEVERAGING DLTS TO COMBAT DIGITAL DECEPTION
There are just a few studies that analyze the use of DLT for
digital deception identification, prevention and detection. This
Section reviews the most relevant aspects detected by such
analyses, which are summarized in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. DLT and blockchain-based applications to combat digital deception.
a) Content moderation: conventional content moderation
processes (e.g., flagging, notice and take down) rely on a
centralized regulator with immediate content removal capabil-
ities. This assessment is not fulfilled necessarily in DLTs, in
particular in the case of permisionless ledgers, where anyone
can participate or become a transaction validator, and there
is no central authority. Therefore, additional research will be
needed in this field.
b) An open protocol for tracking news credibility:
Qayyum et al. [9] introduced the concept of Proof-of-
Truthfulness (PoT), where any node in the network can verify
whether a content is or not part of a blockchain. Content is
stored in a Merkle tree, a binary tree built using hash pointers
in which nodes at the n − 1 level contain hash pointers to
the content stored at the n level. Given a specific content, its
trustworthiness could be verified in O(log(n)) by searching
throughout a single tree branch from the content to the root
(level 0).
c) Incentivized truth: the Latvian 4Facts.org platform
[10] is an example of scalable blockchain-based solution for
fact-checking. Reliable fact-checkers are identified (since they
are interested in validating content) so they can get financial
rewards (e.g., tokens), as well as to increase their reputation for
high-quality work. The amount of received rewards increases
as the fact-checker improves his/her/its reputation. In the
proposed system, content creators will be also interested in
submitting their content for validation in order to build their
reputation.
d) Community-driven dApps: crowdfunding approaches
can use tokens to incentivize the discovery of truth. In DLT-
based social networks, users can exchange tokens or coins
through the same social network in a straightforward way. For
instance, users can perform secure P2P transactions without
third-party intermediaries through cryptographically signed
smart contracts.
e) Reputation systems: computing a reputation score can
be used for quantifying the credibility of a publisher and warn
readers when the content shows traits that may indicate biases.
In [9], it is proposed a dynamic reputation set: an initial zero
score is assigned to each non-verified media and the score
evolves as the entity shares trustworthy verified news. If a
minimum reputation score is not achieved within a specified
time slot, its identity will be revoked. Registered consumers
provide feedback through the platform or score the credibility
of the content, like in the case of BitPress [11]. Nevertheless,
the problem of subjectivity, bias and the risk of malicious
actors have to be further studied.
f) Social media platforms with digital identities: the
Solid (Social Linked Data) project [12] proposes a set of tools
for building social decentralized applications (dApps) based on
Linked Data principles, resulting in improved privacy as well
as true data ownership, access control and storage location.
Another interesting initiative is the Content Blockchain
Project [13], an open and decentralized blockchain ecosystem
for the distribution of media content operated and owned by
the industry itself. The main element of the project is the
International Standard Content Code (ISCC), which is similar
to identifiers like the International Standard Book Number
(ISBN), but with enhanced functionality in order to create
a user-friendly application that generates ISCCs without any
cost.
g) Additional platform-based services: Online platforms
(e.g., Mozilla, Facebook, Twitter) and trade associations (e.g.,
EACA, IAB Europe, WFA) have made some progress in their
commitment to tackle fake news [14]. For instance, Google
has announced the Google News Initiative to support the news
industry in quality journalism.
h) Proof of Authenticity: automatic management of non-
tampered content and multi-node content verification can help
to overcome the problem of verifying big data news streams.
DLTs inherently guarantee data integrity once transactions are
stored. This feature makes DLTs an essential infrastructure for
notarization services [15]. Nevertheless, a central problem is
how to ensure that data are not forged before they are inserted
into a block. Service providers can take a fundamental role to
provide a tamper-proof way to notarize content (e.g., by gen-
erating a digital signature) using a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI).
i) Provenance and ownership: the use of DLT tech-
nology would also allow for making content forgery almost
impossible by demonstrating its origin and, in case of detecting
a counterfeit, it would make the owner accountable. For
instance, Huckle et al. [16] proposed an Ethereum framework
with standardized metadata for the verification of the authen-
ticity and the provenance of digital media. Such a prototype
uses Interplanetary File System (IPFS) [17], a P2P content-
addressed file system. However, the ability of the proposed
system to find fake resources is somewhat limited (i.e., it is
not able to prove the authenticity of a story as a whole).
A similar solution is described in [16], where the authors
present an early prototype of the ‘Provenator’, which stores
provenance metadata (i.e., objects, events, agents and rights)
on an Ethereum blockchain that allows users to check the
provenance of media resources. The solution assumes that
the Provenator was used to document the resource in the first
place. Although the solution solves the provenance issue, its
ability to find digital deception is rather limited.
j) Traceability: Shang et al. [18] trace the source of
news by keeping a ledger of timestamps and the connections
between the different blocks. The proposed procedure is as fol-
lows. First, when media are writing news, the related content,
category and other information are uploaded to the blockchain.
Then, in the process of communicating the news, it is recorded
the release date, the hash value and the timestamp of the pre-
block so that the chain structure can be formed. Third, when
readers consume news, they can trace the source through the
chain structure of the blockchain and the stored information.
Although this scheme seems promising, the authors point out
that the construction of the whole traceability system needs to
be further explored.
Another relevant proposal can be found in [19], where the
authors present an Ethereum-based solution for multimedia
history tracking. The proposed architecture uses IPFS, an
Ethereum name service and a decentralized reputation system.
In addition, smart contracts are used for permission manage-
ment. Furthermore, the operational cost of smart contracts on
an Ethereum network was evaluated in terms of Ether and
Gas, concluding that the cost of all the used functions were
less than $ 0.1.
k) Forensics: it is challenging to make sure that devices,
content and intellectual property are legitimately used with
authorization and to prove forensically with a certain degree
of confidence when otherwise. Once security is compromised,
if there is an intellectual right infringement or a counterfeit,
forensics can recreate what has happened to answer what,
when, who, where, and how. DLT-based notary services offer
unarguable digital evidence because the integrity of the content
has been cryptographically guaranteed.
l) Usage of smart contracts: a smart contract can add
functionality to a DLT as it is a computer program that is
stored in the distributed database [19]. Smart contracts allow
for the addition of validations, constraints and business logic
to transactions in a form of an agreement between parties.
For example, a smart contract can be used to store relevant
information such as publisher identity, status, reputation score,
public key, timestamp, and then broadcast the content to the
P2P network. Moreover, smart contracts can be used to regis-
ter, update and revoke the identities of different organizations
(e.g., publishers), as well as to determine their status and
reputation score [9].
IV. CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• The current efforts of the research community are mostly
focused on one type of fake news (i.e., verifiable false
content), while other bad practices are barely studied.
• Most digital deception detection proposals are based on
cryptographic hashes, which are sensitive to noise and,
when there is a change of a character, a pixel or a bit
in a certain content, it can result in a different hash
[16]. While any minimal change in two resources will
generate vastly different hashes, the use of perceptual
hashes produces comparable results if the resources are
similar. Hence, perceptual hashing is already used to de-
tect copyright infringement, as well as in digital forensics.
Another alternative to overcome this problem is the use
of a semantic similarity index of a content published by
different sources. This index can be measured by ML
methods (e.g., word2vec) and it can be used to assess the
integrity by checking it on the DLT (i.e., whether it was
published or not by a verified entity).
• The DLT system alone is not able to fully evaluate
the authenticity of an input content. Consequently, it is
essential to develop a system that is resilient to data
falsification attacks, which inserts forged data into the
DLT. To face this issue, it is recommended to include
contextual knowledge to corroborate the integrity of the
news. Further research may include the use of DLT
together with AI and NLP methods to develop deep
insights about similarities and to quantify trustworthiness.
• Strengthening cybersecurity and preserving privacy and
security of content shared on social media is also a
key issue, since they may be used to train an ML
model to create fake content. DLT-based solutions can
cryptographically store the content in such a way that
every transaction and interaction with it is traceable.
• There are still open issues related to the DLT compliance
with the GDPR [20], especially when dealing with the
role of the controller, the feasibility of data anonymiza-
tion and the ease of subject rights. Compliance with
current legislative directives implies the cooperation of
a wide range of global stakeholders.
• Future platforms will have to ensure safety and trans-
parency providing a trade-off between content moderation
(e.g., freedom of expression, right to receive information)
and personal data protection.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Provenance, authenticity and traceability can be guaranteed
with DLTs when creating a P2P platform for tackling digital
deception. This article analyzed some applications currently
under development and proposed a number of additional mech-
anisms to control content. Although there are technological
and practical limitations of DLT technology when combating
digital deception, the trust mechanisms provided by DLT can
make it more adequate than other technologies for ensuring
authenticity and auditing, and eliminating counterfeit reality.
Moreover, future researchers are encouraged to develop joint
AI and DLT solutions in an enhanced coordinated effort to
address all the aspects of digital deception.
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